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ISSN 2617-4162 e-ISSN 2617-4170

Social and Legal Studios

Current

Social and Legal Studios

Vol. 9, No. 2, 2026

Social and Legal Studios

ISSN 2617-4162

e-ISSN 2617-4170

Publisher: Lviv State University of Internal Affairs

Received 22.01.2026, Revised 20.04.2026, Accepted 27.05.2026 Published 01.06.2026
Article

The role of the military ombudsman in protecting the rights of military personnel during armed conflict: International experience and Ukrainian realities


Abstract

This article analysed the establishment and development of the institution of the military ombudsman in Ukraine within the context of international experience of democratic civilian control over the security and defence sector. The study was based on a comparative analysis of military ombudsman models in Germany, Canada, Australia, Ireland, and the Republic of South Africa, which made it possible to identify the key criteria for the effectiveness of such institutions: the degree of institutional independence, the scope of powers, mechanisms of parliamentary or executive accountability, and the availability of effective instruments for addressing violations of military personnel’s rights. The study established that the most effective models are those operating independently of direct executive influence and providing the ombudsman with the authority to initiate investigations, conduct inspections, and issue binding or highly influential recommendations. Particular attention was paid to the effectiveness of advisory models which, despite the formal existence of mechanisms for protecting military personnel’s rights, often fail to ensure their proper practical implementation. The article examined the process of establishing the institution of the military ombudsman in Ukraine, which in 2025 moved from legislative initiatives to institutional formation through the adoption of a specialised law and the establishment of the Office of the Military Ombudsman as an auxiliary body under the President of Ukraine. At the same time, it was demonstrated that the key challenges identified at the stage of conceptual design remain relevant, particularly with regard to the level of institutional independence, mechanisms for implementing recommendations, and the effectiveness of responses to systemic violations of military personnel’s rights. Updating the findings as of 2026 has shown that the introduction of the institution of the military ombudsman confirmed earlier scholarly predictions concerning the need for a specialised and independent mechanism for protecting the rights of military personnel. At the same time, the practical implementation of the institution has given rise to new debates concerning its place within the system of state authority and the adequacy of its powers to ensure a genuine impact on the elimination of violations. Consequently, the study has both theoretical and practical significance, as it enables an assessment of the evolution of the institution of the military ombudsman from a conceptual model to an actual element of the system of democratic oversight under conditions of armed conflict and the transformation of Ukraine’s security sector


Keywords: institutional guarantees for the protection of rights; civilian oversight; human rights protection mechanisms in the defence sector; transformation of defence governance; military law


Suggested citation

Strotskyy, R., Stetsyuk, S., Оnyshko, O., Kateruna, K., & Fedina, N. (2026). The role of the military ombudsman in protecting the rights of military personnel during armed conflict: International experience and Ukrainian realities. Social and Legal Studios, 9(2), 79-90. https://doi.org/10.32518/sals2.2026.79
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